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Abstract
The choice between modern nation-building and integration into supranational European and Euro-Atlantic structures 
remains a strategic challenge for the Balkan countries. Success in solving this problem of predominantly mono-ethnic Croatia 
and Slovenia has not yet become a model to follow. Serbian and Albanian national issues cannot be resolved. Serbia’s defeat in 
the Balkan wars of 1991–1999 over the creation of a “Greater Serbia” led to the country’s territorial fragmentation. Two Albanian 
national states emerged in the Balkans. Attempts to create a union of Kosovo and Albania could turn the region into a whirlpool of 
ultra-nationalist contradictions. The European Union has started accession negotiations with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the Republic of Northern Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. The success of these negotiations depends on the readiness of the 
EU and the ability of these Balkan states to adopt European norms and rules. The accession of all Balkan nation-states to the Eu-
ropean Union must finally close the “Balkan window” of the vulnerability of the united Europe. Nation-building in the Balkans on 
the basis of ethnic nationalism sharply contradicts the purpose and current values of the European integration process. For more 
than three decades, the EU has been pursuing a policy of human rights, the rule of law, democracy and economic development 
in the Balkans. The region remains vulnerable to the influences of non-European geopolitical powers: the United States, Russia, 
Turkey, and China. The further scenario of the great Balkan geopolitical game mainly depends on the pro-European national 
consolidation of the Balkan peoples and the effectiveness of the European Union’s strategy in the Balkans.
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1. Introduction
Of all the explosive issues that confronted Europe after the downfall of communism, na-
tionalism proved the most intractable. When boundaries were redrawn after the upheavals of the 
Second World War, sizable minorities still remained within the borders of many states, as the 
accompanying map shows. National ambitions, suppressed or permitted only cultural expression 
during the decades of Communist rule, quickly resurfaced in Central and Eastern Europe, Czecho-
slovakia, as we have seen, divided peacefully in 1993 in response to Slovak pressures. But in Yugo-
slavia centuries-old national and religious tensions, kept in check under previous regimes, tore the 
state apart. Boundaries and names are essentially as they were from the end of the Second World 
War until 1990–1991. Ethnic differences in these countries made democratization and economic re-
newal difficult and even threatened their existence as viable states. In what was Yugoslavia, Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes were inextricably intermixed, about 2 million Slavic-speaking Muslims have 
also long lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina and there are many Albanians, not Slavs and mostly Muslim 
in Kosovo and in Macedonia.
Historians debate the main causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Ivan Banac believes that the 
main reason is the historical identity of the Balkan peoples [1, p. 12]. Brown Joel drew attention to 
the features of Yugoslav communism [2, p. 24]. These features, according to Mike Glenn, caused 
the fierce war during the breakup of Yugoslavia [3, p. 44]. John Goldfarb underlines the democratic 
authority of the Tito regime [4, p. 78]. Ralph Darendorf is in solidarity with this view [5, p. 29].
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The British historian Malcolm Noel points out that national problems in Kosovo [6, p. 29] 
and Bosnia [7, p. 44] have contributed to the destruction of the multicultural Yugoslav society. 
Identity wars have provoked fierce wars in the Balkans [8, p. 18]. Different Yugoslav identities 
hampered the emergence of communism [9, p. 87]. Todorov’s Maria believes that the bloody break-
up of Yugoslavia has complicated the formation of a modern European identity in the Balkans [10].
The aim of the study is to identify the nationality factor in the breakup of Yugoslavia.
2. Material and Methods
2. 1. Background of Balkan nationalism
The entire large area of the Balkan Peninsula in southeastern Europe, including the once 
powerful medieval kingdom of Serbia, had been conquered by the Ottoman Turks in the fourteenth 
century and brought under Muslim rule; some parts of the area were gradually reconquered by the 
Habsburg. When the Ottoman Empire decayed in the nineteenth century, Serbia, after 500 years of 
Muslim rule, regained its status as an independent kingdom. In the late nineteenth century it found 
a patron in tsarist Russia, with which it shared its Eastern Orthodox Christianity. With Russian 
encouragement, the Serbs agitated for an enlarged South Slav or Yugoslav state for all people, 
speaking the Serbo-Croatian language, which is including themselves and the Croats, Slovenes and 
Bosnians then living in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. That agitation, because it became entangled 
with the pre-1914 alliance systems of the great powers, led to the First World War. The assassina-
tion at Sarajevo of the heir to the Austrian throne kindled the great conflagration in 1914 [1, p. 88].
At the collapse of the Habsburg empire in 1918, Serbia, together with likeminded South Slav 
nationalist, proclaimed the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes’ under the Serbian monar-
chy, which Bosnia-Herzegovina also joined. There were ethnic, religious, and historical differenc-
es and populations were mixed throughout the new kingdom. In religion the Serbs were Eastern 
Orthodox Christians, the Croats and Slovenes were Roman Catholic, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
there were many Slavs, who had converted to Islam during the long Ottoman domination. But the 
differences, it was thought, could be submerged in the new state, which in 1929 was officially re-
named Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia was overrun and occupied by Nazi Germany during the Second World War and 
Croatia for a time was governed as a separate Nazi puppet state. The Yugoslavs forcefully resisted 
the Nazis but also fought a bitter civil war among themselves, between royalists and Communists 
led by Marshal Tito. The country emerged under a Communist regime, headed by Tito, who in 
1946 created a federal Yugoslav republic with six component republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia, there were two autonomous provinces as well. 
Although himself a Croat, Tito suppressed Croatian and other separatist movements as counter-
revolutionary but allowed the component republics various forms of autonomy. In Bosnia-Herze-
govina he recognized the Bosnian Muslims as a distinct national group, on an equal standing with 
the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. Although the Serbs and Croats together comprised over 
half the population of Bosnia, the Muslims, as the largest single national group, came to dominate 
the government [8, p. 114]. After Tito’s death in 1980, separatist movements at once emerged. His 
successors, struggling with many other problems, including a failing economy, tried various solu-
tions, among them a rotating federal presidency, but none worked satisfactorily. When revolution-
ary changes transformed Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, Yugoslavia’s Communist 
reformers loosened the regime’s authoritarian grip, and the separatist pressures exploded.
2. 2. The Resurgence of Nationalism
Here, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union, onetime Communist 
leaders, seeing power slip away because of the collapse of Communist regimes, placed themselves 
at the head of nationalist crusades. The Serbian one-time party leader, Slobodan Milosevic, made 
clear from the late 1980s his intention to rally Serbs in every one of the Yugoslav republics to his 
pan-Serb cause. Alarmed by Serb militancy, Croatia and Slovenia held a referendum and in 1991 
proclaimed themselves independent states. They received immediate recognition from the inter-
national community, which was persuaded by Germany that prompt recognition would forestall 
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Serbian aggression. Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the behest of its Muslim-dominated government but 
over the opposition of its Serb and Croat populations, soon followed suit. The secession of the three 
states and their immediate international recognition infuriated Serbia [6, p. 19].
War broke out in mid-1991 when Serbian armed forces proceeded to carve out enclaves in 
the many areas, where Serbian minorities lived, claiming the need to protect fellow Serbs. Serbian 
guerrilla forces, supported by the Serb-controlled central Yugoslav army, took up arms against 
Croatia and Slovenia, and seized a territory in each. After several months of fighting, in which 
25000 lives were lost, a cease-fire was arranged. But the worst violence occurred when both Serbs 
and Croats attempted to create enclaves for themselves in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For years the mixed 
population, despite ethnic and religious differences, had lived peacefully side by side. In the war 
that ensued, which included a protracted siege of Sarajevo and other cities, terrible atrocities oc-
curred on all sides. But it was Serbian military units and armed forces that were principally respon-
sible for brutalizing the Muslim population and for acts of cruelty, not seen for a generation in Eu-
rope. The savage deeds, shamelessly labeled ethnic cleansing included wholesale civilian slaughter, 
pillage and mass rape. A shocked world cloud scarcely believes such events were occurring in the 
civilized Europe in the closing decade of the twentieth century. Religion and national fervor made 
a toxic brew [2, p. 94].
3. Research results 
The international community could not agree on steps to confront the situation. Armed 
contingents of the UN were unable even to deliver humanitarian relief. The Security Council 
imposed economic sanctions against the rump state of Yugoslavia, consisting now of only Ser-
bia and its historic ally, Montenegro; embargoed the shipment of arms (which mainly hurt the 
Muslims); and made plans for war crimes trials. But the fighting and atrocities continued. Given 
the historical complexity of the Balkans and the memories of earlier ferocious conflicts, neither 
the European powers, which might have been expected ferocious conflicts, neither the European 
powers, which might have been expected to take the lead, nor the United States would intervene 
at any early stage with any meaningful show of force. Much later, in 1994, to end the brutal 
siege of Sarajevo the UN, the United State, and NATO mediated a cease-fire and committed 
themselves to air strikes, if it were violated. For Bosnia-Herzegovina a diplomatic settlement 
was being negotiated whereby Croats and Muslims agreed to create a Croat-Muslim federation 
in what remained to them of Bosnia after the Serb, who occupied two-thirds of Bosnia and a 
fourth of Croatia, with every intention of retaining them. On the other hand, the Russians were 
now using their influence with the Serbs to bring them to the conference table. Notwithstanding 
the enormous differences to be resolved, there was some hope that the fighting might end, or 
taper off. By 1994 200.000 were dead or missing, mostly in the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
since 1991; there were about 4.4 million displaced persons. Even with some kind of negotiated 
settlement, grave complications were still likely in the Balkans because of ethnic and religious 
tensions, ties to the outside world, and the residue of hatred and mistrust. 
4. Conclusions
1. From 1993 to 2017 the International criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia tried po-
litical and military leaders for war crime, genocide and other crimes, committed those wars. The six 
constituent republics that made up the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. After the breakup the Republic 
of Montenegro and Serbia formed a reduced federative state, officially known until 2003 as the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia. This state dissolved when Montenegro and Serbia each became indepen-
dent state in 2006, and while Kosovo proclaimed its independence from Serbia in 2008. 
2. An important factor in blurring multicultural identity was the revival of economic na-
tionalism. At the heart of these political developments is economic nationalism, which is doctrine, 
based on predispositions and policies, which prioritize the maintenance and development of the 
domestic economy. An underlying assumption of economic nationalism is that people, forming a 
nation, enclosed within the geographical borders of a state, have a common interest, which tran-
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scends class or other social divisions within that state and takes precedence over linkages between 
domestic actors and foreign ones. The crucial component of economic nationalism is that national 
identities should determine economic outcomes. The objective of economic nationalism is to pro-
tect home industries and agricultures’ from foreigners. The promotion of the interest of a nation 
state can be achieved by different political forms, such as one nation conservatism, autocratic pol-
itic system. The state furthers the power of domestic economic interests. The transnational nature 
of many modern corporations will significantly modify the promotion of national interest within a 
nation state. This collision is a functional and mental moor in the process of European integration 
of the Balkan states. 
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